

Class Dismissed: Massachusetts' Lack of Preparedness for K–12 Digital Learning During COVID-19

By Dr. John Flores and David Clancy



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Pioneer Institute is an independent, non-partisan, privately funded research organization that seeks to improve the quality of life in Massachusetts through civic discourse and intellectually rigorous, data-driven public policy solutions based on free market principles, individual liberty and responsibility, and the ideal of effective, limited and accountable government.



This paper is a publication of Pioneer Education, which seeks to increase the education options available to parents and students, drive system-wide reform, and ensure accountability in public education. The Center's work builds on Pioneer's legacy as a recognized leader in the charter public school movement, and as a champion of greater academic rigor in Massachusetts' elementary and secondary schools. Current initiatives promote choice and competition, school-based management, and enhanced academic performance in public schools.



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Introduction

With Massachusetts' school closure extending until the end of the 2019–20 academic year,¹ Pioneer Institute urges that Massachusetts schools offer meaningful online and virtual learning programs, doing everything possible to eliminate problematic inconsistencies across Bay State school districts.

Pioneer further urges Massachusetts to develop and distribute for timely public comment two plans, one that will remedy this semester's educational gaps during the 2020–21 school year, and another to address future extended school closures, if and when they might occur.

Relatedly, after this crisis passes, Massachusetts should take steps toward generally improving its knowledge and capabilities with respect to online learning, which Pioneer, Bay State lawmakers, and nationally-recognized experts on digital learning have long identified as a significant area of weakness in Massachusetts' K–12 education system.

As Julie Young of ASU Prep Digital wrote in a September 2017 op-ed, which appeared in news outlets across the state:

“Massachusetts struggles to keep pace with innovative online educational offerings that have helped students thrive throughout the nation.” The Commonwealth is home to digital learning experts Paul Peterson, [the late] Clayton Christensen, Michael Horn, and John Flores, yet it has been unable to establish a strong virtual-learning ecosystem.”²

The Delayed March 26 DESE Guidance

Governor Baker's original, March 15, 2020 order, which closed brick-and-mortar school buildings until at earliest April 6, required the state Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) “to support public school systems in developing and implementing plans to assist families and students in accessing alternative learning opportunities during the period in which this Order is in effect.”³

The DESE did not publish formal guidance until March 26, nearly two school weeks later.⁴ That guidance—softly characterized as “Recommendations”—advised schools to “launch” virtual learning by “early April,” therefore contemplating the possibility that some districts would be without such plans for multiple weeks in the heart of the school year. Unsurprisingly, confusion reigned in that interim. On March 24 the *Boston Globe* reported one superintendent as stating “[i]t's kind of like we're getting ready to fly the plane and we're building the plane at the same time.” The same article reported that part of the “scrambling” to develop online learning included a partnership between the state and WGBH to “launch online

learning resources” for children, including television programming “between noon and five” every weekday. This partial outsourcing of education to WGBH—and television screens—was cobbled together because, as Governor Baker said, “they [WGBH] and [the state] understand that not every district and not every student has the same access to computers, the Internet and tablets.”⁵

During this unfortunate two-week period, districts improvised. For example, 12 districts published their own “Joint Statement On Shared Beliefs/Goals” on March 24 (i.e., before DESE's guidance) expressing their own philosophy and goals for remote learning.⁶ It should not have been necessary for districts to fill a fundamental void—concerning educational “beliefs” and “goals”—in this manner.⁷

The DESE's March 26 recommendations were therefore slow in coming, but also, upon arrival, substantively flawed. For example:

- **Content of Education.** The recommendations “strongly” advised that schools focus solely on “reinforcing” matters already covered at school rather than teaching “new material.” The Recommendations were otherwise vague on the substance of education. While describing the safety and well-being of students, families, and staff as the “top priority,” the Recommendations did not use the word “curriculum,” nor reference the core subject areas in the Massachusetts Curriculum Frameworks: history, English language arts, mathematics, science and technology; remarkably, these topics were not mentioned in the guidance, suggesting a concerning de-prioritization of matters central to education.
- **Duration of the School Day.** The recommendations called for “meaningful and productive learning” for “approximately half the length of a regular school day,” which, in an unspecified proportion, could combine “educator-directed learning” with “student self-directed learning.”
- **Educational Methods.** The recommendations listed a variety of remote learning “tools” (including “video or audio conference calls,” “1:1 phone or video calls,” “email,” “work packets,” etc.) but were vague regarding the use of these tools. For example, while the recommendations called for “[o]pportunity to connect with one or more educators multiple times per week,” and “[a]ccess to multiple hours per day of academic content directed by educators,” they made no specific recommendation about the extent to which teachers should educate children through live online sessions against other available methods.
- **Student Participation.** The recommendations “strongly recommend[ed]” that districts use a “Credit/No Credit” approach to grading, “so as to incentivize continuous learning,” but did not require it. The recommendations

stated that schools “could incorporate other incentives to keep students motivated” but the document did not identify possible such incentives.

- **Teacher Feedback.** The recommendations stated: “To the extent practicable, teachers should provide feedback on student work completed at home.” That wide-open articulation allowed for limitless approaches to teacher review of the day-to-day work of children.

The March 26 DESE guidance recognized that upon issuance “districts and schools across the commonwealth have been operating with various remote learning models for their students, with significant variation from one district to the next,” and the guidance unfortunately left intact a patchwork and uneven educational regime. Boston, for example, embarked on the school closure with a large technological gap: the *Boston Globe* reported that “[b]efore the pandemic struck, an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 Boston Public Schools students lacked ‘adequate technology’—meaning they don’t have regular access to a computer or the Internet or both.”⁸ In a rush, Boston purchased and distributed 20,000 Chromebooks.⁹ An April 6 *Boston Globe* article reported the experience of a sixth-grader as follows:

“Since schools shut down in Boston on March 17, the 12-year-old’s direct contact with his teachers has been limited to two online exchanges with his math teacher and a few text messages (from his English instructor, the only teacher Malaki knows how to reach quickly when a question occurs). Most days, he picks up assignments posted online, and completes them alone: no questions asked; no calls from his teachers; and no way to call most of them.”¹⁰

In the wake of the March 26 recommendations, problems existed across a diversity of districts, such that the commonwealth’s students, as a whole, were not experiencing the challenge they would have experienced in school, nor a consistent baseline across districts in terms of the amount of educational activity, the content of educational activity, or the amount and nature of teacher interaction. Even now, weeks later, an analysis by the Massachusetts Business Alliance for Education shows disparities among our 20 largest school districts on dimensions as fundamental as grading policy, whether the district is teaching new content, and whether the district is providing Wi-Fi access.¹¹ A detailed April 8, 2020 *Education Reform Now* analysis ranked Massachusetts behind 43 other states—including all other New England states—in its transition to virtual learning. The 43 states ranked above Massachusetts had (at the state level) required or more strongly encouraged

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districts to engage in virtual learning, and provided clearer guidance on how to do so.¹²

By way of illustration, one of those higher-ranked states is Rhode Island. According to an April 23 *Boston Globe* analysis, Rhode Island provided swifter, firmer guidance to school districts than Massachusetts.¹³ When Rhode Island closed its schools on March 13, it advanced the April vacation to the next week, giving school districts time to develop and submit remote learning plans, while simultaneously communicating that those plans should strive—among other things—for a “similar workload” to regular school, and daily interaction between teachers and students.¹⁴ The article reported that as of mid-April, Rhode Island public school students’ participation rate in remote school averaged approximately 90 percent, in contrast to widely disparate rates in Massachusetts—from 90 percent in Andover, to 50 percent in Boston, to 30 percent in Chelsea.¹⁵

The April 24 Updated Guidance – A Long Overdue and Only Partial Remedy

On April 24 DESE released additional guidance.¹⁶ This “Updated Remote Learning Guidance” came many weeks into the school closure, and the impact of that lapse of time was inevitably compounded by the need for school districts to digest and implement the new guidance, with relatively little time remaining in the school year.

The new document does provide additional guidance on curriculum, calling for a “focus on teaching the content standards most critical for student success in the next grade level”—and identifies those standards in detailed attachments, one for elementary grades (K–5), and one for secondary grades (6–12). This is constructive, but does not appear to profoundly alter the March 26 recommendations’ emphasis on “reinforcement” of already-taught content. Each of the two curriculum-related attachments states on page 1: “*Since most standards will have already been taught prior to the closures, we anticipate that significant time would still be spent on reinforcement.*” [emphasis added]

The updated guidance states that “the only area where we are materially modifying our initial recommendations is the focus on covering the prerequisite content standards”.¹⁷ Unsurprisingly, then, it does little to remedy other deficiencies in the March 26 guidance:

- **Duration of the School Day.** The updated guidance does not alter the half-day expectation, except that—in a section titled “Provide a manageable number of lessons and assignments”—the document seems to shorten that expectation for lower grades (“[T]he overall student

remote learning day is expected to last roughly half as long as the regular school day. **However, academic time on task should appropriately vary by grade level**, with enrichment opportunities filling in the remaining remote learning time.”¹⁸

- **Educational Methods.** The updated recommendations continue to list menus of options without making concrete recommendations about the extent to which particular options should be used,¹⁹ meaning students in different districts and grades could have very different experiences with respect to such fundamental matters as how often they experience lessons actually delivered by their teachers (through live or pre-recorded videos) vs. how often their day is largely or entirely a matter of completing worksheets, or reading assigned texts. (At the same time, the guidance does state a preference for pre-recorded videos over live online lessons, due to concerns about student availability.)²⁰
- **Student Participation.** The updated recommendations re-state the “Credit/No Credit” approach (to “incentivize continuous learning while acknowledging the challenging situation we face”), but they seem to soften it further by **“expand[ing] on this recommendation to encourage districts and schools to promote students to the next grade level.”**²¹
- **Teacher Feedback.** The updated recommendations remain unclear on expectations in this regard. A section titled “Emphasize student engagement in core instruction” lists examples of the “many ways to maximize student engagement.” These include “[f]requent feedback on student work” among others, such as “Gamified, self-paced learning platforms” and “[P]roject-based learning on an engaging, socially relevant topic.” But that same section concludes with the sentiment that “one of these methods is not necessarily better than the other.”²²

Despite Massachusetts’ Immense COVID-19 Challenges, the Failure to Advance Virtual Learning Capabilities was Longstanding

Unquestionably, the challenges faced by DESE and the districts in recent months due to COVID-19 are huge and, in this realm, unprecedented. And there is much to commend about the energy and resourcefulness of teachers—and students—striving to adapt to this unusual circumstance. One vivid example: an Easthampton High School team, under teacher Kelley Brown, recently won the national “We the People: the Citizen

and the Constitution” civics contest, after final preparations and a competition conducted entirely online. Less visible successes and accomplishments are occurring all over the state, involving dedicated teachers, administrators and students. However, great difficulties nonetheless exist, and they are accentuated by a long-existing structural and educational deficiency: Massachusetts’ lack of preparedness in the realm of virtual learning.

That is a frustrating story beginning years ago, when Massachusetts—with a statute in 2010, and another in 2013—ventured into the evolving field of virtual education. However, the state inhibited this process in many ways, a problem that was noticed at the outset. In late 2010, a *Boston Globe* op-ed by State Representatives Marty Walz and William Brownsberger decried the “crippling requirement that schools draw a large portion of their students from their own district,” which “limit[s] the statewide expansion of any district-sponsored virtual school.”²³ Even after the 2013 statute,²⁴ obstacles remained, and inhibited progress. In a 2017 *Lowell Sun* op-ed, virtual learning pioneer Julie Young recognized that Massachusetts “boast[s] some of the most dynamic and thoughtful approaches to brick-and-mortar education, providing a model for the rest of the country,” but Massachusetts has at the same time been resistant to change:

“Several years ago, Massachusetts passed virtual-school legislation. Susan Patrick, president and CEO of the International Association for K-12 Online Learning, advised the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education on regulations to accompany the new law. She recalls making three basic recommendations: Don’t put any geographic restrictions on the schools, don’t impose an enrollment cap on them, and let the money follow the student. Unfortunately, the department largely ignored her advice.”²⁵

Pioneer Institute has pressed this issue from the start with research and advocacy.²⁶ In 2013, Pioneer went so far as to develop and publish a guide to starting an online school.²⁷ Last month, Pioneer released a guide specific to the present situation—the policy brief titled “Shifting to Online Learning in the COVID-19 Spring” by Julie Young and William Donovan.²⁸ Pioneer’s efforts in this area over the past decade include the support and recommendations of this paper’s co-author John Flores of the United States Distance Learning Association (USDLA).²⁹

Pioneer Institute’s April 17, 2020 “The Learning Curve” podcast featured Michael Horn, an expert in education innovation (and Massachusetts resident), who confirmed the unfortunate reality that—despite the urgings of Pioneer, USDLA

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and others—Massachusetts is a “laggard” in the area of virtual learning, which is “tethered” to traditional school models while other states progress and innovate.³⁰

If the commonwealth had instead diligently advanced its knowledge and capabilities with regard to virtual learning, as have many other states, our resources and sophistication today—years after Massachusetts began its halting experimentation with virtual education—would have been far superior. And our ability to handle a shock to the traditional, brick-and-mortar system would also have been proportionally superior. While there is no single cause of the present educational crisis—districts’ individual approaches represent, among other things, varying local philosophies of education, and varying dynamics among parents, school committees, administrators and teachers—the above-described resistance to technological change has surely played a significant part in the current situation.

As stated by co-author John Flores in a recent *Commonwealth Magazine* article:

“Massachusetts is routinely cited as having one of the nation’s most innovative economies. The cornerstone of

that innovation is education—both K-12 and colleges and universities.

There too Massachusetts has done well in recent decades. But one of the things the pandemic has laid bare is the Commonwealth’s failure to keep pace with innovative K-12 online education offerings. This has resulted in an uneven transition to online learning that threatens to cost students a third of their school year.”³¹

The present situation is extremely unfortunate for individual students, for cohorts of students (i.e., students in poorly transitioning districts), and also for parents and guardians, who have a strong interest in their children’s education

The present situation is extremely unfortunate for individual students, for cohorts of students (i.e., students in poorly transitioning districts), and also for parents and guardians, who have a strong interest in their children’s education, and who need the structure of school to allow a proper focus on their own work. The commonwealth’s taxpayers generally should also be frustrated: the Massachusetts public schools spend billions of dollars each year.³²

Massachusetts should do all possible to salvage this school year, and to be more prepared for school closures in the future, whatever their cause, and whether they involve individual schools, districts, or (as in this remarkable circumstance) the entire state.

Recommendations

1. **A Timely, Public Fall 2020 Plan.** The DESE and school districts should be working now on a plan for the fall 2020 semester which ensures that the education gaps of this spring are filled fully and quickly, and which takes into account the possibility of additional closures.

Importantly, that plan should be released publicly early enough to allow meaningful input from the broader community, including parents. What students are taught, and how they are taught, is ultimately a democratic decision, yet meaningful evaluation and comment will not be possible unless the fall 2020 plan is released publicly well before September.

2. **A Separate Plan For Future School Closures.** The commonwealth should also be working now on a plan for any similar school closure, which many experts believe may occur again as soon as the fall. Such a plan should be periodically reviewed and kept up

to date. The negative impact on learning, especially among disadvantaged students, cannot be allowed a second time. The commonwealth must be ready.

The planning should embrace the five recommendations in the Pioneer Institute’s April 2020 report, “Shifting to Online Learning in the Covid-19 Spring,” authored by Julie Young and William Donovan.³³ The brief calls for surveying families to determine who needs devices and who is without access, and filling the gaps; equipping schools with a Learning Management System (LMS) and a student information system (SIS); training teachers; serving students with disabilities; and establishing clear daily schedules. That brief provides concrete ideas and resources for accomplishing these goals.

Related additional guidance is available from the U.S. Distance Learning Association, some of which is distilled in the May 6, 2020 *Commonwealth*

Magazine article “Time for Massachusetts to Up Its Online Learning Game.”³⁴ Among many key principles, particularly relevant here are educating and training teachers on virtual learning through continuing professional development; ensuring that communication to *parents and guardians* concerning virtual learning is timely and substantive (e.g. formal tutorials), so that parents and guardians understand— among other things—their role in the process, and the program’s substance and goals; provision of the full range of school services (such as library services, counseling services, and special needs services); and ensuring continual formal evaluation of the process, with the input of all stakeholders (including parents and guardians).

3. Improvements to the Spring 2020 DESE Guidance.

Going forward, the DESE should improve its guidance in the areas identified in the body of this paper, now to the extent practicable, and certainly in its planning for fall 2020 and beyond. Specifically:

- a. **Content of Education.** In a school closure situation, particularly a long one, Massachusetts should be prepared to advance the curriculum, rather than engage entirely or largely in reinforcement of previously-taught material. DESE should be focused on how to avoid a lengthy and damaging pause in education from occurring again. While the DESE is correct to be concerned about student safety and well-being, it should better calibrate this concern with academic imperatives.³⁵
- b. **Duration of the School Day.** At least in a lengthy school closure, Massachusetts’ remote learning plan should not abandon half of each school day, as has occurred this spring. A more ambitious school day should be the goal, at minimum in Secondary Grades.
- c. **Methods of Teaching.** The DESE should provide clearer guidance to schools in this area, not simply listing menus of options, but providing direction, and expressing preferences, among those options. Otherwise students will have very different experiences—some enjoying substantial teacher contact (e.g., through live or pre-recorded video instructions) and others not.

- d. **Student Participation.** In a future school closure, Massachusetts should be prepared to continue grading student work. The abandonment of grades may have been necessary in the sudden disruption of spring 2020, but it cannot serve as a model for similar situations that may unfortunately occur in the future.
- e. **Teacher Feedback.** Expectations in this area should be strengthened and clarified, so that teachers have a clearer understanding of their own role with regard to assignments, and students are less likely to have greatly varying experiences in terms of interaction with teachers.

In performing this work, the commonwealth should learn from district and charter public schools, as well as private schools, that managed this transition well.

More generally, Pioneer calls for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to apply policy energy and resources to improving its knowledge and capabilities with respect to online learning. For years, Pioneer has warned that Massachusetts is far behind other states on virtual learning and urged the commonwealth to redo its unhelpful regulation of virtual schools.

We must learn the many and varied lessons of this unexpected crisis. In the realm of education, the crisis reminds us of the critical importance of delivering educational programs at a consistent level of excellence, and teaches that we must vigorously improve our preparedness and capabilities—both to keep pace with ordinary-course innovation in other states, and to be ready for future emergency school closures. Education of young people is crucial to their intellectual and social development, and to the state’s future; we cannot allow an interruption like this one to occur again.

Endnotes

- 1 <https://www.mass.gov/news/baker-polito-administration-announces-extension-of-school-and-non-emergency-child-care-0>
- 2 <https://www.lowellsun.com/2017/09/01/julie-young-mass-has-tools-to-lead-in-online-learning-but-doesnt/>
- 3 <https://www.mass.gov/doc/march-16-2020-k-12-school-closing-order>
- 4 “Remote Learning Recommendations During COVID -19 School Closures,” DESE, March 26, 2020, at <http://www.doe.mass.edu/covid19/on-desktop.html>
- 5 <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/03/25/metro/baker-orders-schools-closed-until-early-may/?event=event12>
- 6 <https://sites.google.com/bedfordps.org/bps-resources-and-enrichment/district-updates?authuser=0> (visited May 19, 2020). For example, this statement—correctly contemplating extension of the original, April 6 end-date for school closure—promised to “commit to planning and supporting learning that lessens stress and anxiety,” announced that “new content and grades are not a priority at this time,” and concluded with: “In remaining focused on the social and emotional needs of our students and offering learning experiences that support those needs, we believe that our students, your children, will be well served during this school closing.”
- 7 Worth mention here is a concerning aspect of this Joint Statement. Regarding the then-foreseen extension of the original, April 6 end-date for school closure, it stated: “While this probable extension is creating many conversations about what learning should look like during this time away from the classroom, this vision of education will be best coming from those of us who work with children.” (emphasis added.) How to educate children is a matter for the entire community. To the extent this statement intended to suggest unilateralism by educators within the district, that is wrong—and another symptom of insufficient guidance at the state level.
- 8 <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/03/24/nation/still-waiting-laptops-some-boston-students-struggle-stay-connected-teachers-school/>
- 9 *Id.*
- 10 “Online, but Off-Kilter: A Day In The Life of a Boston Sixth Grader,” Boston Globe, April 5, 2020, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/04/05/metro/education-interrupted/>
- 11 <https://www.mbae.org/initiatives/remote-learning-comparison-tool/>
- 12 “Speeding Ahead: Covid-19 School Closures and Distance Learning,” April 8, 2020, at <http://edreformnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Speeding-Ahead-4-8-Updated.pdf>
- 13 <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/04/22/metro/when-it-comes-online-learning-two-new-england-neighbors-take-wildly-divergent-paths/>
- 14 *Id.*
- 15 <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/04/22/metro/when-it-comes-online-learning-two-new-england-neighbors-take-wildly-divergent-paths/>
- 16 “Updated Remote Learning Guidance,” April 27, 2020, at <http://www.doe.mass.edu/covid19/on-desktop.html>. This one-page document attaches the guidance document itself (“Guidance: Strengthening Our Remote Learning Experience”) as well as two other attachments: “Massachusetts Elementary Prerequisite Content Standards” and “Massachusetts Secondary Prerequisite Content Standards”.
- 17 See “Guidance: Strengthening Our Remote Learning Experience,” at 6.
- 18 *Id.* at 9 (emphasis in original).
- 19 *Id.* at 7 (listing “strategies” in a section titled “Prioritize meaningful connections with educators and peers”), *Id.* at 9 (listing “ways to maximize student engagement” in a section titled “Emphasize student engagement in core instruction”, but stating “One of these methods is not better than the other; school committees should choose strategies that work for their students and staff”).
- 20 *Id.* at 11.
- 21 *Id.* at 5 (emphasis in original).
- 22 *Id.* at 8 (emphasis in original).
- 23 “A (Real) Virtual Education: Massachusetts Should Be Pioneering Online Learning, Not Restricting It,” Marty Walz and William Brownsberger, Boston Globe, September 8, 2010, at <https://bostonglobe.newspapers.com/image/444066437/?terms=walz%2Bbrownsberger>
- 24 <https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXII/Chapter71/Section94>
- 25 “Massachusetts has tools to lead in online learning—but doesn’t”, Lowell Sun, September 1, 2017, at <https://www.lowellsun.com/2017/09/01/julie-young-mass-has-tools-to-lead-in-online-learning-but-doesnt/>.
- 26 See e.g. “Removing the Barriers, Virtual Schools and State Regulation,” Keynote Remarks by: Susan Patrick, President & CEO, International Association for K-12 Online Learning Thursday, March 1, 2012, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyHgLQsJz9U&feature=youtu.be&t=1371>, and other information and resources at <https://pioneerinstitute.org/virtual-learning/#toggle-id-1>.
- 27 “Online Learning 101: A Guide to Starting a Virtual School and its Challenges,” William Donovan, at <https://pioneerinstitute.org/featured/new-guide-to-starting-online-schools/>
- 28 “Shifting to Online Learning in the COVID-19 Spring,” Pioneer Institute Policy Brief, Julie Young and William Donovan, April 13, 2020, at <https://pioneerinstitute.org/featured/new-report-offers-case-study-for-transition-to-online-learning/>
- 29 <https://usdla.org/distance-learning-coronavirus-covid-19-information/>
- 30 <https://pioneerinstitute.org/podcast/the-learning-curve-national-education-podcast/>, at minutes 25–27.
- 31 “Time for Massachusetts to Up Its Online Learning Game,” John Flores and William Donovan, Commonwealth Magazine, May 5, 2020, at <https://commonwealthmagazine.org/education/time-for-mass-to-up-its-online-learning-game/>

- 32 Taking into account state, local and federal sources, Massachusetts public schools spent \$16.2 billion in 2017–2018. See “DESE Policy Brief” at <http://www.doe.mass.edu/finance/statistics/>
- 33 “Shifting to Online Learning in the COVID-19 Spring,” Pioneer Institute Policy Brief, Julie Young and William Donovan, April, 2020, at https://pioneerinstitute.org/featured/new-report-offers-case-study-for-transition-to-online-learning/?av_sc_blog_page=3
- 34 “Time for Massachusetts to Up Its Online Learning Game,” John Flores and William Donovan, Commonwealth Magazine, May 5, 2020, at <https://commonwealthmagazine.org/education/time-for-mass-to-up-its-online-learning-game/>
- 35 For Pioneer research on this topic, see <https://pioneerinstitute.org/featured/new-study-finds-multiple-problems-with-push-for-social-emotional-learning-in-k-12-education/>, and also <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RUst5FAT8>

About the Authors

Dr. John G. Flores is CEO and executive director *emeritus* of the United States Distance Learning Association, and an authority in the field of education, technology, and telecommunications. Flores lead a Global Association focused on the application of distance learning for varied constituencies using varied technologies. He has held leadership positions as a School Superintendent, University Executive Dean and Business CEO for Distance Learning companies. He received his MA Degree from Boston University and his Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut focusing on educational technology, instructional design and leadership.

David S. Clancy, a resident of Concord, Massachusetts, is a partner in the law firm Clancy & Shine LLC, which focuses on civil disputes. Mr. Clancy was previously partner at an international law firm, from which he retired after a 20-year career, also practicing civil litigation. Among other professional activities, Mr. Clancy served three terms on the Board of Editors of the *Boston Bar Journal*, and has published multiple articles in that and other legal publications.

About Pioneer

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